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In this paper, we investigate patterns of team formation amongst barristers who appeared before the UK 
Supreme Court between October 2009 and August 2015. We show that there is evidence of considerable 
gender homophily in the formation of teams of barristers appearing before the UK Supreme Court. Same-
sex teams of barristers are over-represented compared to the number we would expect if barristers paired 
up randomly. We also show that this gender homophily remains when we allow for the possibility that 
barristers pair up randomly within their chambers, or within their area of law. As such, the formation of 
teams of barristers in the Supreme Court is governed by practices and preferences which make same-sex 
legal teams more likely than they would be if team formation simply involved a gender-blind draw from a 
pool of lawyers. Barristers appearing before the Supreme Court prefer, for whatever reason, to work with 
other barristers of the same sex. We set out reasons why homophily in team formation is undesirable and 





We are grateful for comments on an earlier draft from the two anonymous referees, Nicholas Allen 
(barrister, 29 Bedford Row), Fiona de Londras, John Flood, Jeremy Hopkins (former Practice Manager at 
3 Verulam Buildings), Marc Mason and Erika Rackley. Chris gave a version of this paper at the 
University of Copenhagen in March 2016 at a Workshop entitled, ‘Trust, Social Capital and Networks: A 
different perspective on International Courts’. We are both grateful for feedback from the workshop 
participants. The usual disclaimer applies. 
Patronising Lawyers? Homophily and Same-Sex Litigation Teams before the UK 




In 2013, the Centre for Family Law and Practice intervened in In the matter of A (Children)
.1 The Centre was one of three intervenors, the others being Reunite International and Children and 
Families Across Borders. What was unusual about this intervention was that all four counsel appearing on 
behalf of the Centre were female: Baroness Scotland QC appeared along with Ruth Kirby, Rachel 
Chisholm, and Maeve O’Rourke. Same-sex legal teams are not per se remarkable. All-male legal teams 
are quite common before the Supreme Court. Indeed, the respondents in In the matter of A were 
represented by four male barristers. Yet all-male legal teams escape notice because most of the barristers 
who appear before the Supreme Court are male. Consequently, it is easy to ‘explain’ all male teams as a 
‘natural’ outcome of random sampling from a very unbalanced pool of lawyers. To wit: if three-quarters 
of all lawyers before the Supreme Court are men (and they are), and if legal teams were to be formed by 
drawing names out of a hat, then the chances of an all-male team of two lawyers would be relatively high. 
The chances would simply equal the probability that one randomly drawn barrister from the pool of those 
appearing before the Supreme Court would be male (three-quarters), multiplied by the probability that a 
second randomly drawn lawyer would be male (also three-quarters).2 The chances of an all-male two-
person team would therefore be approximately 75% * 75% = 56%. The chances of all all-male team of 
three lawyers would be lower (75% * 75% * 75% = 42%), and that of an all-male team of four lower still 
(75% * 75% * 75% * 75%= 32%), but in no case would these odds seem exceptional. By contrast, under 
the same assumptions, the chances of an all-female team are somewhere between low and exceedingly 
remote. The chances of an all-female team of two lawyers is relatively low, at one quarter times one 
quarter, or 6.25%; the chance of an all-female team of four lawyers is tiny, at 0.4%.  
 
Given this, either the formation of the eight-handed female legal team that appeared on behalf of the 
Centre for Family Law and Practice was a very improbable event, or the formation of legal teams is 
governed by practices and preferences which make same-sex legal teams more likely than they would be 
if team formation simply involved a gender-blind draw from a pool of barristers. The purpose of this 
article is to draw attention to the second possibility, and in particular the possibility that lawyers might 
prefer to work with other lawyers of the same gender. Phrased slightly differently, we wish to know the 
degree to which the formation of barrister teams before the UK Supreme Court is characterised by gender 
homophily, and which factors exaggerate or attenuate this characteristic. To do this, we use data on the 
gender of all of the barristers who appeared before the UK Supreme Court between October 2009 and 
July 2015: 1,292 individual barristers in 470 cases. Using this data, we are then able to work out whether 
the number of same-sex teams of barristers is greater or smaller than the number which would be 
predicted if team formation were gender neutral. With the aid of logistic regression models, we are able to 
progressively introduce other factors which might explain the relative preponderance of same-sex legal 
teams without needing to invoke gender homophily.  
 
In the section that follows, we briefly describe how the several Bars of the United Kingdom are 
organised, and provide some summary statistics regarding their diversity (or lack thereof). We set out 
why diversity at the Bar (and in particular among those appearing before the Supreme Court) is 
important. We then formally introduce the notion of homophily, contrasting homophily in team formation 
with gender-neutral team formation. We then go on to contextualise and present our data, before 
discussing methods of analysis of team formation. These methods move from the simple to the more 
complex: we begin by presenting the results of a cross-tabulation of barrister genders, before progressing 
to logistic regression models. We will come to show that same-sex teams of barristers (both male and 
female) are statistically over-represented in Supreme Court litigation compared to the number we would 
expect if barristers paired up randomly. We will also come to show that this gender homophily remains 
when we allow for the possibility that barristers pair up randomly within their chambers, or within their 
area of law. We conclude by reflecting on the significance of our findings in the light of stated objects for 
gender equality at the Bar.  
 The British Bar: Context and Diversity 
 
Explaining patterns of legal representation before the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is difficult 
because there is no United Kingdom Bar, but rather a separate Bar for each legal system of the United 
Kingdom. This section begins by discussing the Bar of England and Wales, before noting more briefly the 
situation in Scotland and Northern Ireland (where the respective Bars are much smaller).  Readers already 
familiar with the respective Bars may wish to proceed quickly through this part of this section. It then 
turns to the work on diversity at the Bar before setting out why diversity might be thought to be important 
in this context. 
 
England and Wales 
 
The 16,000 barristers in England & Wales are specialist courtroom litigators, and until 1990 had a virtual 
monopoly on advocacy.3 The Bar is an historic, traditional institution with antique-like qualities dating 
back to the 13th century.4 Unlike law firms, which are owned (usually, but not exclusively) by the solicitor 
partners,5 with employee solicitors and others working for those partners, the majority of barristers (just 
under 13,000) are self-employed.6 They commonly work in chambers, groupings of self-employed 
barristers under the same umbrella (e.g. ‘29 Bedford Row’). They do not share profits with each other 
(save via contributions to chambers for matters including real estate maintenance, IT and other support 
functions). Their work is almost exclusively derived from solicitors who instruct the barristers on behalf 
of the clients.7 Barristers’ clerks act as intermediaries in the giving of work from solicitors to barristers, 
and otherwise act as support for the members of chambers.8 Progression at the Bar appears in various 
forms. Certain barristers ‘take silk’ and are known as QCs (Queens Counsel). Becoming a QC was once a 
matter of nods and winks, an informal ‘old boys club,’9 but is now a (seemingly) independent process 
which begins with an application by the barrister to QC Appointments.10 The other significant route of 
progression for barristers is to join the judiciary which, while outside the primary scope of this paper, has 
its own challenges in the context of diversity and inclusion.11 The self-employed nature and 
organisational structure of the Bar in England & Wales, and the way in which work is given or allocated 
to barristers, are important considerations for our discussions below. 
 
The Bar, like the other branches of the legal profession in England & Wales, does not reflect the society it 
serves. The Bar Standards Board (the regulatory body for barristers) publishes diversity statistics on an 
annual basis. The report for 2015 draws on data from the Core Database (the membership records of the 
Bar Council, which includes voluntary questions on diversity characteristics) and the Pupillage 
Registration Survey (a voluntary diversity survey of pupil barristers (i.e. trainees) undertaken by the 
BSB).12 In terms of gender,13 women make up just over a third of the overall Bar (35.9%), but far fewer 
women (13%) are QCs.14 This is striking given there is almost gender parity at the introductory pupillage 
stage (48.5% women),15 and given that ‘trickle up’ arguments have been put forward for some time as to 
why the profession is not more diverse at the senior levels (i.e. that the profession was not diverse enough 
at entry and so diverse members did not trickle up/progress). Little has changed in the last 5 years: 
women made up 14% of QCs and 35% of the overall English & Welsh Bar in 2010.16  
 
Scotland and Northern Ireland 
 
The Scottish legal profession is divided into solicitors and advocates. The division is roughly analogous 
to the division between solicitors and barristers, but it is far more common for advocates to have first 
practised as solicitors.17 It is not possible to provide firm conclusions as to rates of change within the 
profession, as the Faculty of Advocates (the body which brings together all Scottish advocates) does not 
systematically compile information on the diversity of the Faculty in the way that the Bar Standards 
Board does for England and Wales. Nor is current diversity data available on the Faculty website. Instead, 
we asked the Faculty for data on the gender composition of its advocates:18 of 453 practising advocates, 
329 are male and 124 are female. The proportion of female advocates (27%) is lower than the proportion 
of female barristers in England and Wales (35.9%). This is notwithstanding the fact that undergraduate 
law cohorts have been majority-female in Scotland as early as 1983.19 112 advocates in Scotland are QCs, 
92 male and 20 female. The percentage of female QCs in Scotland (16%) is slightly higher than the 
proportion in England & Wales (13%).  
 The Faculty of Advocates occupies a more central role in relation to Scottish advocates than the Inns of 
Court do for English and Welsh barristers. The Faculty of Advocates, though like the Inns of Court in 
bringing together all Scottish advocates, is dissimilar in that it enjoys a single, central physical location in 
Parliament House, which contains the Advocates’ Library. Melville and Stephen describe the Advocates' 
Library as providing a form of “hot-desking” avant la lettre, such that “the senior might have just 
received instructions, and... walk through the library looking for a free junior”. We raise this as the 
greater physical clustering of advocates thus offers greater potential for the formation of homophilous 
ties, independently of the patterns of stratification known to exist in the Faculty.20  
 
In Northern Ireland, the split between barristers and solicitors is analogous to that in England & Wales. 
The Bar Council, the combined regulatory and representative body for barristers in Northern Ireland, does 
not publish any data on the gender breakdown of the barristers it regulates. Its website simply sets out a 
list of all barristers in the jurisdiction.21 These total 786, and each entry in the list has a title 
(Lord/Mr/Miss/Ms/Mrs). Counting these, we see that 35% of all Northern Irish barristers are female 
(almost identical to the percentage in England & Wales), and that 17% of QCs in the jurisdiction are 
female (slightly higher than for England & Wales). We have been unable to find any data or commentary, 
published by the Bar Council or elsewhere, which shows trends over time as regards gender and the 
Northern Irish Bar. 
 
Research on Diversity and the Bar 
 
Our work here is concerned with gender preferences, and gendered team formation, among barristers in 
the UK Supreme Court. While there is a relatively voluminous body of research on diversity and 
solicitors in England & Wales,22 comparatively little has been done in relation to the Bar. What work does 
exists suggests patterns of inequality, exclusion and forms of direct and indirect discrimination. In 2014, 
the Bar Council conducted focus groups and interviews with 85 women barristers. The women who had 
been in practice at the Bar for some time spoke of, “a hostile environment, inappropriate behaviours and 
discrimination in the allocation of work (particularly in crime by both clerks and solicitors) when they 
started their working lives”, but that these experiences had changed, for the better, over time.23 The power 
of clerks in allocating, or not allocating, work to female lawyers has been a recurrent theme ever since 
women were first allowed to join in the Bar in 1919.24 This phenomenon may be important for our 
research.  
 
In research covering pupillages from 2004-2008, Zimdars and Sauboorah found that, “social origin 
factors play a role in influencing earnings, employment status and location.”25 More specifically, their 
data showed that, “Women and those older than 25 earn significantly less during pupillage. Women, those 
older than 25 and those with a disability are more likely to join the employed Bar.” The constant 
‘othering’ of women at the Bar is a recurrent theme in the existing scholarship. These findings in many 
ways mirror patterns of diversity and difference in the solicitors’ branch of the profession.26 Recent work 
has shown that, despite the changes outlined above regarding appointment to Queen’s Counsel, women 
remain statistically less likely than men to be so appointed.27 In work on how the Bar sells itself to 
prospective entrants, Rogers notes how a recruitment event for the Bar that she attended included a 
specific ‘discrimination session’. Panellists at these events warned would-be female and minority ethnic 
student entrants to the Bar that they would face pressure to work in the “in the ‘caring’, less financially 
secure areas”, such as Family Law or Crime.28 A 2013 report by the Bar Council shows that women are 
far more likely to work in the area of Family Law than any other area of law (where fees were historically 
likely to come from legal aid),29 and other data suggests that only 25% of the Corporate & Commercial 
Bar are female.30 In 2014, the Equality, Diversity and Social Mobility Committee of the Bar Council 
commissioned a ‘Momentum Measures’ report.31 The aim was to understand, “when the profession might 
reflect the population profile of England & Wales.” In respect of gender,32 the report comes to two very 
strong conclusions: first, that an overall gender balance at the Bar is “unlikely to ever be achieved” 
(because of high rates of attrition of women barristers); and second, gender balance among QCs and those 
barristers with more than 15 years of experience is unlikely “in the foreseeable future.”33 The picture 
painted thus far is of a Bar which (on the data available) does not reflect the society it serves (particularly 
as regards women, and especially at the senior levels of the Bar), in which there are a number of structural 
and cultural challenges to change, and which offers up a construction of women as uniquely appropriate 
for only certain aspects of the law. 
 
The Importance of Diversity at the Bar 
 
The data we present below shows that women barristers appear in fewer numbers before the UK Supreme 
Court and (and we think more importantly) that single-gendered teams of barristers occur statistically 
more frequently than can be accounted for by chance or by other factors, suggesting there may well be 
forms of same-sex gender-based preferences at play. Or, to put it another way, the teams of barristers 
appearing before the UK Supreme Court are not as diverse as they could or should be. Various reasons 
have been put forward as to why diversity in the legal profession might be thought to important. These 
reasons tend to fall into two camps: a dominant narrative framed around ‘the business case’; and a minor 
narrative which pushes against the business case and which might be thought of as ‘the moral case’.  
 
The business case arguments suggest that more diverse organisations are likely to see, “improvement in 
recruitment outcomes, positive impact on employee performance, reduction of the risk of discrimination-
based litigation, and reduced employee turnover leading to cost savings.”34 Equally, business case 
arguments have been deployed to assert a link between improved diversity and the enhanced ability of 
firms to serve new markets,35 and provide higher quality service to existing clients.36 It is not immediately 
apparent how well the business case arguments, which are framed in terms of organisations (businesses, 
professional service firms, public bodies etc),37 map onto the Bar. At the Bar, turnover is very low,38 the 
vast majority of barristers are self-employed, and any increased ‘performance’ of individual barristers 
may bear little connection on the overall ‘performance’ of their chambers.39 There is also no existing 
work to suggest that business case linked, demand-side diversity drivers (for example, solicitors using 
certain chambers because of their record on diversity) operate at the Bar.40  
 
Given this, why might it matter if barrister team formation in the Supreme Court is based on same-sex 
gendered preferences? In the 2014 ‘Rainbow Lecture on Diversity’ Lord Neuberger framed the ‘moral 
case’ arguments for diversity in the following way: 
 
“[I]t is simply unjust and incompatible with elementary justice that people should have fewer 
opportunities in life because they are women, because they are not white, or because they come 
from a background which is socially or economically under- privileged.”41 
 
A decade earlier, in the Final Report into ‘Entry to the Bar’, he had written:  
 
“Barristers are in one of the most high profile of the professions and should lead the way, and be 
seen to be leading the way, in promoting equality of opportunity and professionalism.”42 
 
Greater equality (here, both as regards the number of women barristers appearing before the UKSC, and 
as regards the gendered formation of barrister teams) “signals equality of opportunity for women in the 
legal profession,”43 over and above any desire for “numerical aestheticism”44  
 
There are also various arguments put forward as to difference making a difference. While, in the UK at 
least, these have been operationalised in respect of a diverse judiciary,45 we think that they may be 
generalizable to the Bar. Male and female barristers may, depending on the context, approach their 
advocacy differently (putting forward different sorts of arguments, framing arguments in different sorts of 
ways etc).46 It has also been suggested that women lawyers may have greater empathy with women 
litigants and witnesses.47 If these arguments are true, then single-gendered teams may be doing their 
clients (and the judges they appear in front of) a disservice by not offering up the greatest possible 
breadth of approaches and arguments.  
Outside of the UK, there is a growing body of literature on the effects of female counsel. Other studies 
have considered the effects of women lawyers appearing before the senior courts in North America (the 
US Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada) and Australia (the High Court). Szmer, Sarver, and 
Kaheny found that: (i) US Supreme Court justices (for the 1993-2001 court terms) are less likely to 
support parties when the attorneys who argue for them are women; and (ii) that as the proportion of 
women attorneys on the petitioner’s side increases relative to that of the respondent, the likelihood of a 
Supreme Court justice making a pro-petitioner decision decreases.48 However, the authors make only 
passing comment to the frequency with which women appear before the US Supreme Court and to the 
likelihood of all same-sex litigation teams in that arena. In later work, Kaheny, Szmer, and Sarver found 
that justices on the Supreme Court of Canada were more likely to vote in favour of parties with a higher 
proportion of female barristers, which the authors attribute, at least in part, to greater gender diversity on 
the bench of that court.49 Lady Hale is the first (and only) woman on the Supreme Court in the UK. In 
this, as in many other things, we would be aided greatly by more female judges in the UK. Smyth and 
Mishra claim that their study of the Australian High Court (reviewing 776 cases between 1994 and 2011) 
is, “the first to find evidence of female barrister disadvantage, at least for female barristers representing 
appellants opposed to respondents represented by male barristers.”50 They argue that their data shows that 
‘gender schemas’ – the idea that sex-linked characteristics are maintained and transmitted to other 
members of a culture (here, the gender of the High Court advocate) - can operate in a negative manner 
between elites in appellate courts.51 While the data from these projects are equivocal (in that they suggest 
that context may have a large role to play), they do suggest elements of gender-based exchanges between 
judges and advocates. 
Lawyers, patronage, and homophily 
 
The literature discussed above give reasons why gender, and gender imbalances, matter in the legal 
profession, and why the pattern seen in In the matter of A (four counsel for the Centre for Family Law 
and Practice, all of whom were women) stands in need of some explanation. Here, we discuss the 
concepts of kinship, patronage, and homophily, before moving on to discuss other concepts (merit, bias) 
which might also explain patterns of team formation. We begin with patronage. 
 
As a behaviour and a pattern of relationships, patronage is found in almost every human society.52 It is 
variously concerned with the use of influence and social position by one person in assistance of another,53 
and/or with the structural issues of protection and loyalty exchanged in transactions between multiple 
parties.54 As such, patronage can either be dyadic, or involve several actors. There are good reasons for 
believing patronage to be important to the legal profession in England. Work from the field of legal 
history suggests that patronage has been one of the organising frames of the Bar since at least the 17th 
Century, at which time family and close family friends would stand as surety (known then as 
‘manucaptors’) behind those seeking admission to the Inns of Court.55 Peacey comments that patronage at 
the Bar at that time should not be understood as a simple relationship between patron and client, but 
should instead be seen as a more complex “manifestation of ties and bonds between groups of men, who 
were both patrons and clients.”56  As such, patronage becomes a concept that is “faceted and multi-
linear”, rather than a one way, dyadic patron-client relationship.57 The calculation of the benefits of 
patronage may therefore involve a life-long process of accounting for different obligations incurred 
through patron-client exchange – except, of course, for women, who were not part of such exchanges. 
This notion of exchange, and of the multi-linear nature of patronage, is important for our research.  
  
Somewhat more recently, Abel-Smith and Stevens have commented on how barristers’ clerks act as 
patrons to junior members of the Bar, despite (in theory) the barrister being senior to the clerk.58 Once 
again, the patronage relationship displays multiple facets. Abel-Smith and Stevens wrote about the 
situation in the sixties, but it is questionable how much patronage at the Bar has really changed, either 
between the period discussed by Peacey and the period discussed by Abel-Smith and Stevens, or indeed 
between that latter period and the present day.59 This is despite claims that the opening up of university 
education in the 1960s has produced a wider, more diverse body of would-be lawyers who are no longer 
dependent on family and kinship connections.60 In the 1990s, “patronage, being noticed and being 
known” were said to be hallmarks of how barristers progressed from the Bar to the judiciary.61  
 
One particular and sometimes extreme form of patronage results from kinship. Empirical work has shown 
that family ties matter for promotion within the judiciary,62 and within the Bar.63 It is not unfair to say that 
“the English judiciary is still predominantly composed of men from a narrow range of educational 
backgrounds often with family connections to the legal profession.”64 What has, of course, changed over 
time is the (limited) opening up of the Bar to women (and other once excluded groups) who were then 
actively excluded from male patronage.65 
 
Patronage is distinct from homophily, the principle that “contact between similar people occurs at a 
higher rate than among dissimilar people.”66 This tendency can occur on the basis of any number of 
personal characteristics and attributes.67 Our focus is on gender homophily, whereby contact between 
individuals of the same gender occurs at a higher rate than between members of different genders. 
Various forms of contact may be characterised by homophily. Although most scholarly effort has 
probably gone into studying homophilous friendship ties, there have also been notable studies of 
homophily in hiring,68 and in team formation.69 
 
Homophily is often treated as given in the sociological literature. To the extent that homophily is 
explained with reference to particular underlying mechanisms (rather than existing as a mechanism in its 
own right), it is explained with reference to feelings of ease and comfort. People feel more comfortable 
with ‘in-group’ members and are said to “more readily offer them trust and cooperation.”70 The 
relationship between homophily and the possession or distribution of social capital is complex. 
Homophily per se does not result in an uneven distribution of social capital. Homophily with respect to 
irrelevant characteristics, or characteristics not ordinarily associated with status, does not bestow social 
capital, or act as a conveyor belt for its transmission. If people formed homophilous ties with respect to 
their star sign, it would not matter very much. Homophilous ties formed on the basis of gender or race, 
however, are rarely innocuous in this way, since these characteristics are in turn associated with status 
within organizations or social milieux. This remains true even when dealing with generally high-status 
professions: high-status jobs carry power, and individuals are more willing to share power with those they 
trust (where such trust is facilitated by similarity).71 Akinola and Thomas explain that “[i]t is well-known 
that the relationships that are the easiest to develop, maintain, and gain comfort from are those in which 
the members share common identity characteristics and similar backgrounds.”72  
 
These homophilous ties can either constitute a form of capital in their own right, or can act as means for 
one party in the tie to acquire social capital at a faster rate. Woodson, in his study of black lawyers in 
large law firms, argues that homophily has the potential to deprive many “of equal access to critical 
relationship capital…thereby reinforcing inequality.”73 In a similar vein, Gorman and Kmec suggest that 
in-group favouritism is one of the processes that can lead decision-makers to prefer male lawyers over 
equally-qualified female lawyers.74 Other work has shown the same to be true in certain parts of the 
banking sector.75 Homophily is often related to (conscious or unconscious) bias in selection processes.76 
In relation to the Bar, Zimdars raises the question of whether “selectors” (in her context, those on 
appointment panels) “tend to default into selecting in their own image by displaying homophilic 
tendencies.”77 In her empirical work on barristers in Australia, Hunter found that, “it appears that the 
reasons why women who had been at the Bar more than 10 years received fewer briefs than men at the 
same level were largely related to homosociality between senior male solicitors and barristers, together 
with stereotypical assumptions held by both solicitors and their clients.”78 The selection of male barristers 
who got work (and the women barristers who did not) came down to “the personal preferences of the 
individual briefing solicitors who will be the ones working closely with the barristers.”79  
 
Bias in selection procedures is sometimes taken to be antithetical to selection based on merit or talent, but 
these two concepts are often constructed in such a way that individuals who form homophilous ties with 
members of the dominant social group often find it easier to become (perceived or judged as) deserving or 
meritorious. As Ashley and Sommerlad have argued, “cultural practices represent more significant 
barriers to the capacity of non-normative professionals to configure themselves as merit-worthy 
professionals, than such tangible obstacles as long hours.”80 For Sommerlad et al, these practices in the 
field of law revolve around the making and sustaining of personal bonds (re-)producing a homo-social 
culture.81 The body of sociological research on workplace interactions points to strong network 
homophily with respect to ties between co-workers and ties with clients.82 For example, in their work on 
doctors, Levinson et al show how gender homophily (a patient’s preference for a doctor of the same sex) 
is greater where the patient’s problem involves psychological intimacy.83 Equally, in his broad review of 
‘women in the legal profession’, Michelson comes to the conclusions that, “all available evidence 
suggests a significant degree of lawyer-client gender homophily, that women lawyers are 
disproportionately likely to represent women clients.”84  
 
This review of the literature suggests that these concepts of homophily and patronage are related, that 
they are ubiquitous in social life, and that they are also present in the legal profession. There are, 
therefore, good reasons for suspecting that homophily should also be present when examining team 
formation before the UK Supreme Court. We would not wish, however, to claim that the literature is so 
univocal as to make the empirical investigation of homophily redundant or obvious: after all, many 
"obvious" claims are false.85 Indeed, there are particular features of the English Bar which may make it 
less suitable terrain for homophily. Barristers are self-employed, and do not work in the same sorts of 
organisational structures that have been the object of past studies (i.e. large law firms). Although 
barristers may be members of the same chambers (explained below), their relationships with other 
barristers, outside of their relationships in court, are more atomised than the relationships between private 
practice lawyers. Insofar as homophilous ties strengthen on the basis of bonding, the more limited 
opportunities for bonding might mean that homophily in the self-employed Bar is much less strong than 
homophily in law firms.  
 
Tackling Homophily Empirically 
 
When measuring homophily, it is helpful to distinguish between baseline homophily and inbreeding 
homophily.86 Baseline homophily is the relative frequency of in-group to out-group ties. If I have more 
ties with other members of my group (however defined) than I have with members of other groups, then 
my ties are homophilous. Though it is sometimes useful to know about baseline homophily, such depends 
strongly on the relative size of groups. Consider the extreme case of a population of 100 divided into two 
groups of 98 and 2. Suppose that every member of the population talks to every other member of the 
population with the same frequency. In this case, the ties of the larger group will be very strongly 
homophilous, since they talk to many more of their own group. Conversely, the ties of the smaller group 
will be very strongly heterophilous, since they talk to many more members of a different group. In our 
context, it would be utterly unremarkable if we were to find that male barristers’ ties are strongly 
homophilous, since there are simply many more male barristers. 
 
For these reasons, it is helpful to move beyond baseline homophily to measure inbreeding homophily, 
which can be defined as “a deviation from what a… model of random assortment would predict.”87 Here, 
the “model of random assortment” acquires a particular importance. In the example used at the start of the 
article, the “model” was random assortment between all lawyers who had appeared before the UK 
Supreme Court. As we shall demonstrate, other models are possible. The point is not to assert a model as 
a true description of assortment – that would be paradoxical indeed. Rather, it gives us a benchmark 
against which to evaluate the degree of homophily which does not depend on relative group size in the 
way that baseline homophily does. 
 
In this article, we focus on inbreeding homophily. Because we do this, everything we say about 
homophily in team formation applies equally to men and women. It does not make sense to talk about 
homophily being stronger or more marked amongst female barristers. Suppose we find that female 
barristers team up with other female barristers at a particular rate. How would we know that rate was a 
high or a low rate? We would know by comparing it with the rate at which male barristers team up with 
female barristers. But in teams composed of only two genders,88 the rate at which male barristers team up 
with female barristers is simply one minus the rate at which male barristers team up with other male 
barristers. For these reasons we can only ever identify homophily simpliciter, and cannot identify a 
particular male or female tendency to homophily. 
Data on counsel and chambers 
 
We collected information on the counsel who appeared before the Supreme Court in cases decided by the 
court between its establishment in 2009 and the summer of 2015. We did this by consulting the lists of 
lawyers which feature on the second page of each judgment handed down by the court. Altogether, we 
identified 1292 individual lawyers in 470 cases. We then identified the gender of each individual lawyer. 
As a first approximation, we used software which suggests the most likely gender for an individual given 
their first name. Because this software recommendations were neither infallible (“Lindsay” is generally a 
female first name, but the housing lawyer “Lindsay Johnson” is male) nor complete (there is no 
recommendation for the first names “Deok Joo” or “Pushpinder”), we manually checked these names. Of 
the 1292 lawyers who appear in our data, and who appeared before the Supreme Court between 2009 and 
2015, 23.6 percent are female. 
 When manually checking the gender of each individual lawyer, we also attempted to record the chambers 
to which they belonged. We did so using internet searches and the Bar Directory online. However, it was 
not always possible to identify the chambers to which each barrister belonged. This is the case, for 
example, with barristers in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, we identified chambers for the vast majority 
of the barristers featured in the data. In total, we identified 155 unique chambers (known as ‘stables’ in 
Scotland). This data was collected in the autumn of 2015. Since some cases were argued some years 
before, it is possible that current affiliations may not accurately represent the situation at the time the case 
was argued.89 Having identified these chambers, we then counted the number of female and male 
members of each chamber, enabling us to calculate the current proportion of male members in each 
chamber. We did so largely on the basis of chambers’ own websites, which were generally more complete 
and up-to-date than the Bar Directory online. In counting the number of female and male members, we 
excluded pupil barristers and door tenants (someone who is affiliated with the set, but does not conduct 
business from chambers’ premises). Just as with the affiliations of counsel, these gender breakdowns 
were collected in the autumn of 2015, and so may not reflect the gender breakdowns in each chamber at 
each point in time where one of their members appeared before the Supreme Court. Figure 1 is a funnel 
plot which plots the size of each chambers against the proportion of males in the chambers. The solid red 
line indicates the weighted average proportion (70.25%). The dotted line indicates 95% confidence 
intervals, such that a chamber which was recruiting barristers in line with the weighted mean should fall 
within the confidence interval on 95 of 100 occasions.90 Outlying chambers are named. 
 
Having calculated for each chamber a measure of the proportion of male barristers, we sought to do the 
same for areas of law. We assigned each case to one of eight broad areas (administrative law; criminal 
law; family law; tax and chancery law; Scots law; Northern Irish law; cases falling under the jurisdiction 
of the Queen’s Bench division; and all other cases).91 We did so on the basis either of the first instance 
court, or the court from which appeal lay. To calculate the percentage of male barristers in each practice 
area, we simply calculated the proportion of male barristers averaging across all UKSC cases belonging 
to that area.92 These proportions are shown in Figure 2. These proportions are in line with the available 
evidence, discussed above, on areas of the law where female barristers are more likely to practise.  
 
Figure 1 - Proportion of male barristers in selected chambers 
 
 

















Evidence from cross-tabulation 
 
In order to demonstrate that team formation before the UKSC is characterised by homophily, we carry out 
simple bivariate analyses, before moving on to more complicated multivariate analysis. We begin by 
cross-tabulating, for each legal team appearing before the Supreme Court with two members, the gender 
of the lead counsel against the gender of the first-listed junior counsel. We assume that the lists of counsel 
included by the UKSC in its judgments reflect seniority, and therefore describe relationships between the 
gender of “lead” counsel, “first-listed junior”, “second-listed junior”, and so on. The distinction between 
lead counsel and junior counsel is fundamental; the distinction between “second-” and “third-listed 




Table 1: Gender of lead counsel by gender of junior counsel 
 
 Junior counsel  
 Female Male All 
 Senior counsel n (%) n (%) n 
 Female 44 (22%) 50 (10%) 94  
 Male 160 (78%) 454 (90%) 615 
 All 204 504 709 
 
 
Table 1 shows the gender of the senior counsel (in the rows) against the gender of the junior counsel (in 
the columns). The table shows that there were 44 teams where both the lead and the first-listed junior 
were female, and 454 teams where both the lead and the first-listed junior were male. Are these 
frequencies greater or lower than we would expect if team formation were not characterised by 
homophily, but were instead gender neutral? To answer this question, we start by considering the total of 
the first column, which refers to female junior counsel. If team formation were gender neutral, then these 
204 female junior counsel would be distributed proportionately between the male- and female-lead teams. 
The vast bulk of them would end up working with male senior counsel, since most senior counsel were 
male. Start by considering the proportion of all senior counsel who are men (615 out of 709, or 86.7%). 
Then multiply this proportion (86.7%) by the number of female junior counsel (204) to give a notional 
total of 177. By following the same procedure, we can calculate the number of female junior counsel who 
would be expected to end up working with female senior counsel. The proportion of all senior counsel 
who are female is 13.3% (100% - 86.7% = 13.3%). Multiply this proportion by the number of junior 
counsel (unchanged at 204) gives a notional total of just 27 female junior counsel who end up working 
with female lead counsel as part of a same-sex team.  
 
This notional total is much lower than the actual figure of 44 same-sex teams of female lawyers. Through 
a necessary complementarity, the number of male junior counsel working with male senior counsel is also 
greater than what one would expect if team formation were gender neutral. Thus, there is evidence that 
team formation is not gender neutral, and is characterised by homophily (rather than the much less likely 
case of heterophily, which would have resulted had the number of same-sex teams been lower, rather than 
greater, than expected). The magnitude of the homophily also seems large. It is not strictly necessary to 
test whether the degree of homophily is statistically significant. Statistical significance testing (usually) 
presumes a distinction between a population and a sample drawn from that population. A statistically 
significant finding is one which we can be confident would also be found were we to collect new samples 
from our population. In the present case, we have almost all of the cases decided by the UKSC, or the 
entire population; there are no as-yet-undiscovered new samples waiting to disconfirm our findings. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we note that these differences are indeed highly statistically 
significant (chi-squared = 16.12 on 1 d.f., p = 0.0001). 
 
Evidence from Logistic regression models 
 
The simple bivariate analysis reported above is insufficient in two respects. First, it does not lend itself to 
easy interpretation of magnitudes. The table above presented counts of different types of legal team 
(male-male, male-female, female-female, female-male, etc.,), and compared these to the counts that 
would have resulted had team formation been gender neutral. This difference in counts is not intuitive, 
and does not really help gauge the magnitude of the homophily. It is helpful to have a method which 
produces such estimates of magnitude directly. Second, a simple bivariate analysis cannot account for 
confounding or moderating variables. Homophily is a common characteristic of team formation, but its 
ubiquity does not mean that it operates in every situation with equal force. In particular, there may be 
recognisable conditions under which members of one type may feel a particularly strong inclination to 
team up with those whom they resemble. Where those conditions can be quantified, we can investigate 
the degree of homophily as moderated by those conditions. 
 
Both of these deficiencies can be remedied by using logistic regression. Logistic regression can be used to 
model any dichotomous outcome as a function of other variables. In this case, we can use it to model the 
probability that a junior member of the team will belong to a particular gender, as a function of the gender 
of the senior counsel. Here, we model the probability that a junior member of the team will be male, 
conditional on the senior counsel being male. The stronger the positive effect of the senior counsel being 
male, the greater the degree of homophily. Because “female” and “male” are (in this application) 
mutually exclusive categories, it is immaterial whether we investigate the probability that junior counsel 
will be male as a function of the senior counsel being male, or the probability that junior counsel will be 
female as a function of the senior counsel being female: a significant finding under one formulation 
necessarily implies a significant finding under the alternative formulation. 
 
 
Table 2: Logistic regression of male junior 
 
  Model 1 
(Intercept) 0.128 
(0.207) 
Male senior 0.915*** 
(0.226) 





Table 2 shows the results of a logistic regression model which uses exactly the same data as used in Table 
1. The intercept shows the baseline risk of junior counsel being male. The coefficient attached to “Male 
senior counsel” shows how the risk changes when the senior counsel is male. Specifically, it shows the 
log-odds ratio: when senior counsel is male, the odds of having a male junior counsel are e0.915=2.497 
times higher.93   
 
Table 3: Logistic regression of male junior, full dataset 
 
  Model 2 
(Intercept) 0.322 
(0.172) 
Male senior 0.695*** 
(0.186) 





Table 3 goes on to show the results of the analysis when we incorporate third- and fourth-listed counsel. 
The degree of homophily is smaller when we include three and four-member teams, but it remains 
positive and statistically significant.  
Control variables 
 
With the basic logistic regression model in place, we can move on to more complicated models, which 
incorporate additional variables. As these additional variables are included, the coefficient associated with 
“Male senior counsel” will change. Were it to be found that the inclusion of an additional theoretically-
justified variable caused the coefficient associated with “Male senior counsel” to shrink to zero, such that 
same-gender pairings were no more likely than mixed-gender pairings, controlling for that other variable, 
we might be said to have “explained away” the apparent homophily that exists. Team formation might 
then be said to be gender-neutral, conditional on some other feature (characteristics of the particular area 
of law, say). 
 
Recall that earlier we discussed both the study of homophily, and the literature on gender equality in the 
English Bar. The literature on homophily discussed the importance of a model of random assortment, 
against which homophily could be evaluated. In the logistic regression model used above, the (implicit) 
model of random assortment is random assortment between lawyers who have appeared before the 
Supreme Court. However, a more appropriate model might involve lawyers randomly assorting within 
their chambers, or alternately, within their predominant area of law. By adding additional control 
variables, we can allow for this kind of assortment. If, say, lawyers randomly assort with other lawyers in 
their chambers, and assort with no other lawyers, then the influence of the gender breakdown in their 
chambers will be significant and positive, and the effect of the gender of senior counsel will be zero. 
Here, we might explain away homophily through controlling for the fact that (as set out above) that 
certain chambers and/or certain areas of law have a greater or less prevalence of male and female 
barristers.  
 
Accordingly, we have undertaken logistic regression models with additional control variables: the 
percentage of male barristers in the relevant area of law (calculated in the fashion described above), and 
the percentage of male barristers found in the senior barrister’s chambers. The results of these are set out 
in Table 4 in the Appendix. Homophily is present and significant across all of these models. Although the 
coefficients for both of the control variables are both positive, suggesting that more male areas are more 
likely to feature male juniors, neither coefficient is statistically significant, which means that we would 
not expect more male areas to feature more male juniors as a matter of course.  
 
There is a significant effect of the percentage of male barristers in the senior barrister’s chambers. Thus, 
the more male the senior barristers’ chambers, the more likely he is to work with a male junior. We test 
whether the size of the chamber moderates this relationship (see the third column of Table 4 in the 
Appendix). There is some evidence to suggest that the effect of the gender composition of the senior 
barrister’s chambers is smaller in smaller chambers (perhaps because barristers are forced to look outside 
their own chambers), but this effect is not significant at standard levels of statistical significance (see the 
third column of Table 4, and Figure 3 in the Appendix). In any case, the effect of homophily is almost 
unchanged, and same-sex teams are still e0.602=1.83 times more likely to form. Consequently, homophily 
cannot be explained by other characteristics commonly cited in discussions of gender stratification within 
the legal profession.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
We have shown that there is evidence of considerable gender homophily in the formation of teams of 
barristers appearing before the UK Supreme Court. Same-sex teams of barristers are over-represented 
compared to the number we would expect if barristers paired up randomly: where the senior barrister is 
male, the odds of the junior barrister also being male are 2.5 times higher. We have also shown that this 
gender homophily remains when we allow for the possibility that lawyers pair up randomly within their 
chambers, or within their area of law. Finally, we have shown that the gender breakdown of chambers has 
greater bite when chambers are small. As such, the formation of teams of barristers in the Supreme Court 
is governed by practices and preferences which make same-sex legal teams more likely than they would 
be if team formation simply involved a gender-blind draw from a pool of lawyers. Barristers appearing 
before the Supreme Court prefer, for whatever reason, to work with other barristers of the same sex. What 
then do these findings mean? 
 
There is no literature of which we are aware which discusses how teams of barristers are formed, and 
which might therefore be able to provide greater insights into the causal processes which sustain 
homophily in team formation. We suggest four possible routes. First, junior barristers might choose the 
senior who will lead them. This may arise either because the case was due to be argued by a single 
barrister, but has now reached the level where ‘double-manning’ is appropriate, or because the case was 
always due to be handled by two barristers, and it is the junior barrister who was first instructed. In either 
case, it would be appropriate to talk of homophily, but it would be more difficult, particularly in the later 
case, to describe such homophily as an example of patronage. We raise the question whether, in non-
homophilous situations where junior female members of the Bar choose to be led by more senior male 
barristers, they are actively opting for ‘safer’ career bets (given the larger numbers of male barristers at 
the top end, and the potential linked opportunities for advancement).  
 
Second, senior barristers may choose the junior who will follow them. This route is the route implicit in 
our statistical model, where the outcome is the gender of the junior barrister, and where the causal (or at 
least correlative) factor is the gender of the senior barrister. Team formation through this route might well 
be considered to involve both homophily and patronage. Third, barristers’ clerks may choose which 
senior or junior works with which junior or senior from their own chambers. In this instance, the 
homophily would be engineered by a third party. The third party may be acting from a preference for 
barristers of a particular gender (a preference which plays out in the choice of both junior and senior), or 
may act under the belief that barristers prefer to work with others of the same gender. Although much has 
been written on the power of clerks in allocating work between barristers,94 we are inclined to discount 
this route on the grounds that if homophily were solely or principally the result of choices made by clerks, 
we would be less likely to see homophily in cases involving barristers from multiple chambers. However, 
additional analyses do not bear this supposition out.95 
 
Fourth, instructing solicitors and/or lay clients may dictate which senior or junior is to be used to 
accompany the existing junior or senior. Whilst we lack information on the gender of instructing 
solicitors, we were able to code the genders of natural persons pursuing cases before the Supreme Court: 
here we found no connection between the gender of the client and the gender of the senior counsel, still 
less a connection between the gender of the client and same-sex barrister teams.96 In practice, teams are 
likely to form as a result of a combination of these four routes. We mention these routes not to identify 
one route as the most likely (we leave that task to future research), but because remedies for homophily 
depend on which route operates. The more homophily operates through the actions of clerks, the easier 
homophily may be to remedy (through raising awareness of the phenomenon, or by asking clerks to have 
due regard for diversity when constructing teams and the monitoring ex ante how diverse the teams that 
they create are). The more homophily operates through the (disaggregated) decisions of juniors who seek 
to curry favour with senior barristers and QCs, the harder the remedy. Other cases represent intermediate 
points.  
 
What we are unable to show is whether homophily in barrister teams appearing before the Supreme Court 
comes about as a result of conscious and/or unconscious decisions. For example, the power of women 
mentoring other women has been a recurrent theme in existing work on the legal profession:97 where we 
have all-women barrister teams, is part of what is going on a conscious form of mentoring? And, if so, is 
this objectionable in a discipline where, as we have already shown, women at the Bar face a series of 
hurdles across their careers? It may be. If, as discussed above, difference makes a difference, and having 
different voices in teams of barristers before the UK Supreme Court is a potential strength (for clients and 
the advancement of their arguments, for development of the law etc) then the homophily that we have 
shown should be of concern. It may also be that women and men choosing to work with (respectively) 
women and men do so for different reasons: more senior women might choose to work with more junior 
female members of the Bar for greater political and/or strategic reasons than their senior male 
counterparts (who may subconsciously gravitate towards junior male barristers to work with). That is, the 
preferencing of junior women by senior women may be more active than the preferencing of junior men 
by senior men at the Bar. Further work would be needed to unpick this.  
 
Our research has implications for how the presence of women at the upper reaches of the Bar can be 
improved. Let us suppose that our findings generalize from the UK Supreme Court to other levels of the 
judicial hierarchy. There is a certain Catch-22 logic to our findings. Women do better as juniors when 
other women are in senior positions (because the seniors can grant the juniors access to more complex 
cases and litigation in the highest courts); but women only reach senior positions after first being juniors. 
If half of senior barristers were women, then gender homophily would not be so objectionable. However, 
given that the Momentum Measures report above suggested that gender parity at the Bar as a whole is 
unlikely to ever be achieved (and parity at the top end of the Bar is unlikely in the foreseeable future), 
further progress towards gender equality at the Bar relies, essentially, on exceptional women breaking 
through. This then impacts on judicial diversity, in two ways. The first is whether (or to what extent) 
litigation team diversity could be a complement or a substitute for (a lack of) judicial diversity. That is, 
whether difference in the administration of justice can be a composite of who the judge is (or judges are) 
and who appears before the judge(s). The second is the extent to which diversity among litigators 
appearing before the Supreme Court impacts on those entering the judiciary from the Bar. If, as Lord 
Sumption has suggested, the judiciary is an option “at the end of a successful career at the Bar”,98 we 
need diversity at the top end of the Bar. Paterson and Paterson argue that, “diversity in senior judicial 
appointments is not simply a desirable goal, but a fundamental constitutional principle. At the very heart 
of the legitimacy of an independent judiciary are its claims to be able to deliver fairness. A senior 
judiciary whose composition reflects an apparent lack of fairness runs the real risk of undermining its 
own authority.”99 Lord Sumption has also previously suggested that, “The main reason for the lack of 
diversity in the English bench is the undiverse character of the upper reaches of the legal profession,”100 
and Lady Hale has suggested that women judges should think about offering themselves as mentors to 
other women seeking entry to the judiciary.101 As we set our earlier, Lord Neuberger, President of the 
Supreme Court, has said that, “it is simply unjust and incompatible with elementary justice that people 
should have fewer opportunities in life because they are women, because they are not white, or because 
they come from a background which is socially or economically under-privileged.”102 Given these 
acknowledgments by serving UK Supreme Court Justices, and given our data, perhaps the next time a 
Justice of the UK Supreme Court notices a eight-handed, all-male, four-person team appearing before 
them, they might ask why this is the case and why there were no equally meritorious female barristers to 





Table 4: Logistic regression of male junior counsel as a  
function of male senior counsel and other variables 
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Nagelkerke R-sq. 0.023 0.022 0.030 
Log-likelihood -692.612 -693.172 -689.818 





Figure 3: The effect of a one percentage point change in the proportion of men in a senior lawyer's 
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